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SPEECH INEQUALITY AFTER JANUS V. AFSCME
CHARLOTTE GARDEN*
INTRODUCTION
The right to free speech does not hinge on wealth, but the practical ability to make
oneself heard often does. The reality is that wealth and income inequality are linked
to what we might think of as speech inequality—the unequal distribution of
opportunities to persuade. Speech inequality has many manifestations, but one of the
most significant arises in connection with electoral politics: many of the means of
persuading others to support a particular candidate that have the greatest reach are
also among the most expensive.
Speech inequality is not an inevitable feature of American electoral politics, at
least not to the degree that exists now. Strategies aimed at reducing the influence of
the rich include contribution and expenditure limits and public financing schemes.
Bottom-up strategies to increase the influence of people who are poor and working
class include campaign finance innovations such as “democracy vouchers” 1 and also
empowering labor unions both to attack the root problem of income inequality and
to pool working-class resources (including shoe leather) to exert influence in the
political realm.
The Roberts Court is a barrier—one of the most important barriers—to reforms
aimed at reducing electoral speech inequality. Over the last ten years, the Court has
struck down several attempts to limit the role of money in politics, establishing a
principle that in the “marketplace of ideas,” the First Amendment demands a laissezfaire approach. The major exception concerns labor unions and their members,
whom the Roberts Court has asymmetrically disempowered in a series of decisions
culminating with Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees, Council 31.2 Janus held that public employees cannot be required to pay

* Co-Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development & Associate Professor,
Seattle University School of Law. This Article is based on remarks delivered at the 2018
Stewart Lecture in Labor and Employment Law. I am grateful for feedback on the project that
I received at the Stewart Lecture, as well as the conference on Labor and the U.S. Constitution
hosted by Cornell ILR School, the conference on Organized Labor and Challenges to
Democracy hosted by Cornell Law School, the symposium on Labor Law and Antitrust Law
in the Age of Trump, hosted by the University of St. Thomas School of Law, and the 2018
meeting of the Law and Society Association. I am also grateful to the editors of the Indiana
Law Journal for their careful work on this Article.
1. Democracy vouchers are a method of public financing in which each eligible voter
receives vouchers worth a set amount, which they can contribute to eligible candidates. The
program was pioneered in Seattle, where each voter receives four vouchers worth $25 each.
See Daniel Beekman, Washington State Supreme Court Unanimously Upholds Seattle’s
Pioneering ‘Democracy Vouchers’, SEATTLE TIMES (July 11, 2019, 8:43 AM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washington-state-supreme-court
-unanimously-upholds-seattles-pioneering-democracy-vouchers-program/ [https://perma.cc/
SXK2-NVRA] (describing Seattle’s voucher system, which was unsuccessfully challenged in
state court under the federal First Amendment).
2. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
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dues or fees to the union that represents them as a condition of their public-sector
employment.3 Because of Janus, unions and their members pay a surcharge—the
cost of representing nonpaying nonmembers—as a condition of engaging in
campaign advocacy.4 This, the Janus majority tells us, is necessary to prevent unions
from exerting their economic influence to try to affect political outcomes.5
This Article explores the growing divide between the Roberts Court’s treatment
of the free speech rights of wealthy individuals and corporations in campaign finance
cases as compared to its treatment of the rights of public-sector labor unions and their
members. First, it highlights some internal contradictions in the Janus Court’s
analysis. Then, it discusses the growing—yet mostly ignored—divergence in the
Court’s treatment of corporate and labor speakers with respect to the use of market
influence to achieve political influence.
The Article has two Parts. In Part I, I explain how the Court reached its decision
in Janus before critiquing the decision’s internal logic on several points. And in Part
II, I contrast the Roberts Court’s approach in Janus to its approach in First
Amendment challenges to campaign finance law, arguing that the Court’s solicitude
towards the First Amendment rights of wealthy or corporate speakers is in tension
with its cramped view of the First Amendment rights of unions and union members.
I. JANUS’S INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS
After briefly situating Janus in its doctrinal context, this Part describes how the
decision’s own logic favors some speakers—those who prefer not to financially
support the union that represents them—over the union itself and union members,
including those who want to engage in politics through their unions. The Court does
this in three ways. First, it identifies one form of purported First Amendment injury
(the payment of an agency fee, compelled upon pain of job loss) and then analyzes
the injury in a vacuum, ignoring that unions and union members have diametrically
opposed First Amendment interests.6 Second, the Court compounds its blindness
toward pro-union workers’ First Amendment interests by imposing on them (and
only them) a bureaucratic hurdle: the requirement that they must opt into paying
union dues or fees by “clear and compelling” evidence.7 Third, the Court vacillates
between treating the case as a challenge to the obligation for a single worker to pay
an agency fee and as a challenge to the totality of the union’s speech at the bargaining
table.8 This Part begins with some doctrinal background and an analysis of the
Court’s decision in Janus and then discusses each of these sources of speech
inequality.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 2486.
See infra Section I.B.
See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
See infra Section I.C.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486; see also infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.D.
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A. The Road to Janus
Mark Janus was employed by the state of Illinois as a child support specialist
when he filed his complaint in what ultimately became Janus.9 The union defendant
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31
(AFSCME) had been elected to represent Janus and his fellow state employees in
collective bargaining and subsequent contract enforcement; in performing those
roles, the union was statutorily required to represent each bargaining-unit member
fairly, whether or not they joined the union.10 In exchange, each bargaining unit
member was required by contract to pay a pro rata share of AFSCME’s
representation costs; in Janus’s case, this amount totaled about $535 per year. 11
At least until the Janus decision, that basic arrangement—known as the “agency
shop”—was replicated in public-sector bargaining units in more than half of states.
It involved three key components: exclusive representation, in which an elected
union is the sole representative of every employee in a bargaining unit; 12 the duty of
fair representation, which prohibits the exclusive representative from treating
represented workers arbitrarily or in bad faith and from discriminating against them
based on their opposition to the union (among other reasons);13 and the mandatory
agency fee, which requires each worker to share equally in the costs a union incurs
while acting as the agent for the workers in the bargaining unit. 14
The agency fee is distinct from union dues, which are paid only by workers who
opt to become union members. Agency fees could only be used for representational
activities, but union dues cover both the union’s work as the bargaining
representative for a group of employees and its other activities, which are sometimes
referred to as “nonchargeable” activities.15 The nonchargeable category includes
many activities that are aimed at building union power. For example, a union’s work
organizing unrepresented workers falls in the category of union activities for which
only union dues, and not agency fees, could be used.16 Additionally, union dues (and
not agency fees) finance union political activity, such as running “get out the vote”
efforts, paying for political advertisements, and the like. 17

9. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461.
10. Id. at 2460.
11. Id.
12. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64–65
(1975).
13. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177–78 (1967) (discussing duty of fair representation
in context of the Labor Management Relations Act, which amended the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935. Ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(b), 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012))).
14. See Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169,
206–07 (2015) (describing the “quid pro quo” in public-sector labor law, in which unions serve
as the exclusive representative for a group of workers and owe each bargaining-unit member
a duty of fair representation, in exchange for agency fees).
15. See generally Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519-24 (1991)
(delineating chargeable and nonchargeable union expenditures).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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The Supreme Court blessed public-sector agency shops in the 1977 case Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education.18 Abood reflected a compromise of sorts between the
union’s and the public employer’s shared position that the union could charge
represented workers for all of its activities19 and the objectors’ position that any stateimposed obligation to pay union dues or fees was unconstitutional. 20 This outcome
mirrored the Court’s approach in earlier cases about the extent to which privatesector employees could be required to pay agency fees under contracts governed by
the Railway Labor Act (RLA).21
In addition to relying on its RLA precedent, the Court gave two interlocking
reasons justifying union agency fees. First, it is costly for unions to provide fair
representation in bargaining and grievance representation, and the fact that the duty
of fair representation is not tied to the payment of agency fees means that employees
could simply free ride if not required to pay the fee.22 Second, legislatures could
reasonably believe that this overall system—collective bargaining with an exclusive
representative that must fairly represent all workers in a unit and is supported by
agency fees—would yield stable labor relations.23
In addition, the Court emphasized the limited nature of the infringement on
represented nonmembers’ freedom, observing that public-sector unions could not
restrict public employees’ speech. “A public employee who believes that a union
representing him is urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public policy is not
barred from expressing his viewpoint.”24 In other words, represented workers are free
to campaign against the union or its priorities. And, as Professor Ben Sachs has
pointed out, the fact that union representation generally results in a wage premium
for workers means that a typical union-represented worker who is unwillingly
compelled to pay an agency fee will still come out ahead25—and they are free to
devote their entire net gain to speech opposing the union.

18. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
19. See generally Brief for Appellees, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)
(No. 75-1153), 1976 WL 181667.
20. See generally Brief for the Appellants, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977) (No. 75-1153), 1976 WL 181666.
21. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 219–20; see also id. at 232 (“The differences between publicand private-sector collective bargaining simply do not translate into differences in First
Amendment rights.”).
22. Id. at 221–22. For a thorough discussion of the free-riding problem to which agency
fees are a solution, see Catherine L. Fisk & Martin H. Malin, After Janus, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019), available at https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3245522 [https://perma.cc/
T69U-4UVK].
23. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222–23. In addition, the Abood Court relied on its own precedent
involving unions governed by the Railway Labor Act. See id. at 219. In other work, I have
criticized both the Abood Court’s reading of these cases, as well as how later decisions
concerning agency fees—including Janus—have described the Abood Court’s treatment of
these cases. See Charlotte Garden, Avoidance Creep, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3356035 [https://perma.cc/
4SGW-PADC].
24. Abood, 431 U.S. at 230.
25. Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1046,
1067 (2018).
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The Abood Court held that under the First Amendment public-sector employers
and unions could not require represented workers to pay the full amount of union
dues, even if those employees were not required to join the union.26 Observing that
a portion of union dues often went towards the union’s political or ideological
advocacy, the Court analogized to its then-recent watershed campaign finance
decision, Buckley v. Valeo: “[o]ne of the principles” underlying Buckley “was that
contributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading a political message is
protected by the First Amendment.”27 Thus, the Court continued, compelled
“contributions for political purposes work[] no less an infringement of [public
employees’] constitutional rights.”28
In other words, the key difference between chargeable and nonchargeable
expenses for the Abood Court was whether or not the union’s spending was justified
by the state’s interest in stable labor relations and avoiding free riding. 29 As the Court
saw it, those interests were implicated only by the costs the union incurred while
acting as the bargaining agent for a group of represented employees.30
In the following decades, the Supreme Court and the lower courts refined and
expanded on Abood, including by ruling particular union expenses chargeable or
nonchargeable and by establishing and refining a procedure for union-represented
workers to challenge the union’s calculation of the mandatory agency fee.31
Alongside those legal fights, political fights resulted in changes to state labor
relations regimes, with some states expanding public-sector collective-bargaining
rights32 and other states restricting or even substantially eliminating those rights. 33
In the early 2000s, both the legal and the political fights accelerated and
intensified. For example, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker signed Act 10 into law
in 2011.34 In addition to prohibiting unions from charging mandatory agency fees,

26. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 (concluding that the objectors’ argument that “they may
constitutionally prevent the Union’s spending a part of their required service fees to contribute
to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive
bargaining representative” was “meritorious”).
27. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 220–21, 232 (explaining justification for agency fees in the RLA context
and then stating that “[t]he differences between public- and private-sector collective
bargaining simply do not translate into differences in First Amendment rights”).
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986)
(establishing procedural requirements intended to enforce Abood’s rules).
32. See SETH D. HARRIS, JOSEPH E. SLATER, ANNE MARIE LOFASO & CHARLOTTE GARDEN,
MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 65, 72–77 (2d ed. 2016)
(describing changes to state public-sector labor laws); see also Brief for the States of New
York et al. at app. at 1–10, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681) 2013 WL
6907713, at *1a–10a (listing state public-sector bargaining laws, including those covering
public employees who were jointly employed by individual customers and the state;
collective-bargaining laws allowing this group of workers to unionize and bargain collectively
with states over working conditions within state control are relatively novel).
33. See Brief for the States of New York et al., supra note 33, at 72–77.
34. 2011 Wis. Act 10; see also Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of PublicSector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511, 532–33 (2013)
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Act 10 either eliminated or curtailed the scope of collective bargaining for most
public-sector employees. This change followed a heated public battle—“the largest
series of protests at the [Wisconsin] Capitol since the Vietnam War,” according to
one publication—during which thousands of protestors occupied the statehouse, 35
and Democratic legislators fled the state in an attempt to prevent a quorum. 36
One year after Act 10, the Supreme Court decided Knox v. Service Employees
International Union, Local 1000.37 Knox did not attract much attention when it
reached the Supreme Court; instead, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. EEOC,38 which raised the question of whether certain religious employers could
invoke the “ministerial exception” as a defense in employment discrimination cases,
arrived at the Court as the Term’s highest profile labor and employment case. 39
As it turned out, Knox was a sleeper case. In a case involving an unusual midyear
increase in union dues and agency fees, the Court held that the defendant union was
required to obtain affirmative consent from represented nonmembers before charging
the increased fees.40 I have criticized the outcome in Knox at length elsewhere,41 and
I discuss the case further below.42 In itself, that holding was not earthshaking,
because unions do not routinely levy midyear dues increases. But Knox is important
for two other reasons. First, Knox held that “exacting” scrutiny should be applied to
agency fees43—a move that predictably “doom[ed] [agency fees], notwithstanding
state legislatures’ efforts to tailor agency fees and collection procedures to meet

(describing the scope of Act 10).
35. Molly Beck, The Protest That Wouldn’t End: Act 10, WIS. ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://madison.com/wsj/the-protest-that-wouldn-t-end-act/article_08d9d341-b665-5733
-983a-de170c671de0.html [https://perma.cc/VQZ9-RQ4N].
36. Wis. Democrats Flee to Prevent Vote on Union Bill, NPR (Feb. 17, 2011, 4:26 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2011/02/17/133847336/wis-democratic-lawmakers-flee-to-prevent-vote
[https://perma.cc/BN9A-2SK5].
37. 567 U.S. 298 (2012).
38. 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
39. As an indication of Knox’s relatively low profile, there were only three amicus briefs
filed in the case—one in support of Knox, and two in support of the union. See Knox v. Service
Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files
/cases/knox-v-service-employees-intl-union-local-1000/ [https://perma.cc/DJQ7-QJSC]. By
comparison, there were thirty amicus briefs filed in Hosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical
Lutheran
Church
and
School
v.
EEOC,
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hosanna-tabor-evangelical-lutheran-church-and
-school-v-eeoc/ [https://perma.cc/AG5N-3FJT]. Two years later, there were eighteen amicus
briefs filed in another union fees case, Harris v. Quinn. See Harris v. Quinn, SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/harris-v-quinn/
[https://perma.cc/W4TFM88K].
40. Knox, 567 U.S. at 322.
41. Charlotte Garden, Meta Rights, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 855, 886–88 (2014) (observing
that “[t]he Court has never convincingly explained why, when, and to what extent” the First
Amendment prohibits a procedure that requires individuals to opt out of nonmandatory
subsidization of a private group, and criticizing the Court’s reliance on untested assumptions
about the behavior and preferences of union-represented workers).
42. See infra Sections I.B & I.C.
43. Knox, 567 U.S. at 310.
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government interests in public-sector collective bargaining.”44 Second, Knox also
began laying the groundwork for Janus; not only was there no obvious way to
distinguish the midyear dues increases, to which Knox applied, from routine dues
assessments, but the majority also questioned whether Abood was still good law.45
This dicta was significant both because the Court relied on it in later cases,46 and
because it was an unmistakable signal to advocates that the Court’s conservative
justices were interested in revisiting Abood.
Two years after Knox, the Court again criticized Abood in dicta. In Harris v.
Quinn,47 the Court stopped short of overruling Abood, instead holding that the
decision did not apply to home healthcare workers who were jointly employed by
states and the customers whom they serve. But before reaching this outcome, the
majority opinion—which, like the majority opinion in Knox, was authored by Justice
Alito—spent several pages criticizing Abood.48 In the view of the five conservativeleaning justices who comprised the majority, Abood “failed to appreciate the
difference between the core union speech involuntarily subsidized by dissenting
public-sector employees and the core union speech involuntarily funded by their
counterparts in the private sector.”49
This time, it was not immediately clear whether Harris meant that more
incursions on Abood, or even a wholesale reversal, were on the horizon. On one hand,
the Court’s criticism of Abood could have been further groundwork to eventually
overturn that decision. But it was also possible that Alito had initially drafted the
decision to overturn Abood, only to reverse course after one or more of the other
justices in the majority balked. If the latter, then perhaps Abood was safe.
It became apparent that the first reading was the correct one when, one year later,
the Court granted certiorari in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association.50 The
main issue in the case was whether Abood should be overturned,51 and the Court
would have been unlikely to grant certiorari if, as of the date the Harris decision was
issued, five members of the Court thought the answer to that question was no. Then,
questioning during oral argument only confirmed that the Court was poised to
overrule Abood, and a list of commentators predicted that result.52

44. Courtlyn G. Roser-Jones, Reconciling Agency Fee Doctrine, The First Amendment,
and the Modern Public Sector Union, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 597, 601 (2018); see also infra Part
I.C.
45. See Knox, 567 U.S. at 311 (“Acceptance of the free-rider argument as a justification
for compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues represents something of an
anomaly . . . .”).
46. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2463 (2018); Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 627 (2014).
47. See Harris, 573 U.S. 616, 635–38 (2014).
48. See id. at 633–38.
49. Id. at 636.
50. 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
51. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct.
1083 (2016) (per curiam) (mem.) (No. 14-915), 2015 WL 393856.
52. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: The Question Not Asked,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/argument-analysis-the
-question-not-asked/ [https://perma.cc/7JF7-5S3A]. I both co-authored an amicus brief in
support of the state and the union respondents in Friedrichs and attended oral argument. My
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Ultimately, the Friedrichs Court did not overturn Abood—instead, it affirmed the
underlying court of appeals decision applying Abood, based on an equally divided
vote following Justice Scalia’s death.53 However, once Justice Neil Gorsuch replaced
Justice Scalia, it was apparent that Abood was again in peril. And indeed, the Court
granted certiorari in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees, Council 31 in September 2017.54 The next Section discusses that
decision.
B. The Janus Decision
Janus undid the Abood compromise, holding that public-sector employees could
not be required to pay any union representation costs. The majority began by stating
that it would apply “exacting” scrutiny—a standard that, like its cousin strict
scrutiny,55 is exceedingly difficult for litigants to satisfy. 56 Unsurprisingly, the Court
did this mainly by relying on Knox.57
The Janus majority suggested that compelled speech might be an even greater
First Amendment harm than a speech restriction; if that is true, then the fact that
speech restrictions receive heighted scrutiny means that, a fortiori, so should
instances of compelled speech.58 As the Court put it, “[w]hen speech is compelled .
. . additional damage is done. . . . [I]ndividuals are coerced into betraying their
convictions.”59 Whether the experience of being forced to mouth particular words is
more “demeaning”60 than being banned from saying particular words is probably a
question on which reasonable minds can differ. However, First Amendment law
involves vastly more cases dealing with speech restrictions than with compelled
speech, and the pedigree of the First Amendment right against compelled speech is
a relatively recent development.
The Janus majority acknowledged in the very next paragraph that paying an
agency fee is not exactly the same as being forced to speak a particular message,
even as it discounted the importance of that difference: “[c]ompelling a person to

own judgment was that five justices would vote to overrule Abood. See John Fensterwald,
Supreme Court Signals It’s Ready to Hand CTA, Public Unions Big Setback, EDSOURCE (Jan.
11, 2016), https://edsource.org/2016/supreme-court-signals-its-ready-to-hand-cta-public
-unions-big-setback/93186 [https://perma.cc/S27M-RZXW] (including my prediction, based
on oral argument, that five justices would vote to overturn Abood).
53. See Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
54. 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.).
55. The Janus Court characterized the requirements of strict scrutiny as follows: “Under
‘exacting’ scrutiny, we noted, a compelled subsidy must ‘serve a compelling state interest that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’”
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018)
(quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012)).
56. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 844–55 (2006) (discussing the
difficulty of meeting the strict scrutiny standard in First Amendment cases).
57. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Knox, 567 U.S. at 310).
58. Id. at 2464.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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subsidize the speech of other private speakers raises similar First Amendment
concerns [as compelling speech].”61 In other words, the Court noted the difference
between speech and subsidization, but ultimately treated the difference as
insignificant. This is a mistake that runs throughout the Court’s agency-fee case law,
including Abood, which held that compelled subsidization of speech implicates the
First Amendment but did not explain why that was so. If the Court’s concern with
compelled speech is related to human dignity—the affront that occurs when
“individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions” 62—then it is not clear why
compelled speech should be equal to compelled subsidization of speech. After all,
individuals must pay taxes that go to support a variety of expressive projects and
speakers with which they disagree, and this does not raise any First Amendment
problems63: why should compelled subsidization of a union raise more serious
dignitary concerns? Janus does not provide answers to this question, nor does it offer
alternative accounts of why compelled subsidization of speech is as troubling as
compelled speech (or, for that matter, as prohibitions on speech).64 Instead, one gets
the impression that a kind of sleight of hand has gone on—and at the end of the trick,
the Court’s majority has pulled out of its sleeve a card reading “exacting scrutiny.” 65
Next, the Court applied exacting scrutiny, considering the justifications on which
Abood rested—labor peace and avoiding free riding. Ultimately, the Court concluded
that neither justification could meet exacting scrutiny. First, the Court agreed that
labor peace, as articulated by the Abood Court, was a compelling state interest but
that agency fees were not required to achieve it.66 Here, the Court relied on the
existence of “right-to-work” public-sector labor law regimes, writing that their
existence illustrated that stable collective bargaining was possible without agency
fees.67
Then, the Court concluded that the government’s interest in avoiding free riding
failed on the first prong of the exacting scrutiny test, writing that “avoiding free riders

61. Id. (emphasis in original).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First
Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171, 184–85 (2018) (discussing irrelevance of whether
compelled subsidization is of government versus private groups); Robert Post, Compelled
Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV.
195, 197 (2005) (“Although Johanns is quite definite that citizens ‘have no First Amendment
right not to fund government speech,’ it never offers a theoretical account of why taxation is
an exception to the basic premise . . . .” (quoting Johanns v. Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562
(2005))).
64. Moreover, the federal courts have extended the Abood rule against compelled
subsidization of speech to only one other arena: unified bar dues. See Keller v. State Bar of
Calif., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990). Yet, as other commentators have discussed, other situations
whose structures seem to mirror Abood do not draw First Amendment scrutiny. For example,
public employees are sometimes required to pay a portion of their salary to private investment
managers. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After
Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 866–68 (2012).
65. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2466 (discussing federal public-sector labor relations).
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is not a compelling interest.”68 The majority began by comparing unions to private
groups that take political positions but do not owe any duty of fair representation to
either members or nonmembers.69 The government, the Court continued, could not
require beneficiaries of the latter groups’ advocacy efforts to pay agency fees to those
groups.70
But what about unions’ duty of fair representation to members and nonmembers?
Here, the Court reasoned that exclusive representation backed by the duty of fair
representation is possible without agency fees because unions would not “refuse to
serve as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit if they are not given
agency fees.”71 First, the Court asserted that unions “avidly” or “eagerly” seek
exclusive representative status72 and that the “benefits” of exclusive representative
status for unions “greatly outweigh any extra burden imposed by the duty of
providing fair representation for nonmembers.”73 This statement is literally true, in
that unions do seek exclusive representative status. But it is also seriously
misleading, because public-sector unions in the United States are typically required
to become the exclusive representative of a group of employees before the employer
will sit down at the bargaining table.74 In other words, the benefit that unions seek
when they obtain exclusive representative status is the ability to engage in collective
bargaining at all. A union that eschewed exclusive representative status would be
able to engage in some forms of advocacy on behalf of its members—for example,
its representatives could speak at school board meetings or lobby state government—
but it would be barred from the core functions of bargaining and then enforcing a
collective agreement.
Second, the Court wrote that agency fees were unnecessary to support the union’s
fulfillment of its duty of fair representation, because that duty is likely
constitutionally required when public-sector unions assume exclusive representative

68. Id.
69. Id. (discussing a group that “lobbies or speaks out on behalf of what it thinks are the
needs of senior citizens or veterans or physicians”).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2467.
72. Id. at 2467 & n.5.
73. Id.
74. American jurisdictions that adopt statutory schemes to allow public-sector collective
bargaining require unions to win exclusive representative status in order to represent workers.
As of this writing, every state statute allowing public-sector workers to bargain collectively
premises the employer’s bargaining obligation on the union winning exclusive representative
status. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/7 (West Supp. 2019); CAL. GOV’T CODE §
3543.3 (West 2019). In other words, public-sector employers will engage with a union at the
bargaining table if and only if that union is the exclusive representative of a group of
employees. (One quasi-exception, Tennessee, allows multiple organizations representing
different groups of workers to participate in “collaborative conferencing,” a process that
affords less power to any of the organizations than collective bargaining typically does. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-5-605 (2016).) While it is possible for unions to advocate for workers even
when their employer does not have a statutory bargaining obligation, that advocacy will take
a much different form and occur in different forums than when the employer does have an
obligation to deal with the union at the bargaining table.
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status.75 Further, the Court suggested that the cost of bargaining a contract that was
fair to nonmembers was not likely to be significantly greater than bargaining a
members-only contract. But the Court’s support for this point was that “neither
respondents nor any of the thirty-nine amicus briefs supporting them—nor the
dissent—has explained why the duty of fair representation causes public-sector
unions to incur significantly greater expenses than they would otherwise bear in
negotiating collective-bargaining agreements.”76 (Here, it is worth remembering that
Janus was decided on a motion to dismiss, meaning that there was no factual record
developed on this or any other topic in the trial court.)77 As to the costs that unions
incur when they represent nonmembers in grievance proceedings, the Court
suggested that unions could charge nonmembers for representation services or refuse
to represent them.78
Next, the Court moved on to “new” arguments—those not based on Abood’s
reasoning—in support of agency fees. First, the Court rejected the union’s originalist
argument that “Abood was correctly decided because the First Amendment was not
originally understood to provide any protection for the free speech rights of public
employees.”79 The majority seemed not to take the argument very seriously, because
it did not believe that the union sincerely wanted the Court to hold that public
employees lacked First Amendment protection—here, the Court cited an amicus
brief filed by a different union in the 2006 case Garcetti v. Ceballos, which argued
unsuccessfully for broad First Amendment protections for employees’ job-related
speech—and because the union also made an alternative argument based on the
Court’s precedents finding that public employees had limited First Amendment
protection from employment-based consequences for their speech.80 Then, the Court
rejected the argument on the merits because “[e]ntities resembling labor unions did
not exist at the founding, and public-sector unions did not emerge until the mid-20th
century.”81

75. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2469 (“[W]e said many years ago that serious ‘constitutional
questions [would] arise’ if the union were not subject to the duty to represent all employees
fairly.” (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944))). For a thorough analysis and critique of the Court’s treatment
of exclusive representation and its possible consequences, see William B. Gould, How Five
Old Men Channeled Nine Old Men: Janus and the High Court’s Anti-Labor Policymaking, 53
USF L. REV. 209, 234-40 (2019).
76. Id. at 2468 (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 2462 (describing procedural posture).
78. Id. at 2468–69. Given the Court’s later observation that it would raise constitutional
questions if an exclusive representative union were not required to represent nonmembers
fairly, it is possible that the Court was referring to members-only representation here. But as
described above, see supra note 76, no state has adopted this labor relations system.
79. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2469 (emphasis in original).
80. Id. (“[W]e doubt the Union—or its members—actually want us to hold that public
employees have ‘no [free speech] rights.’ It is particularly discordant to find this argument in
a brief that trumpets the importance of stare decisis.” (alteration in original) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Brief for Union Respondent at 1, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466))
(citing Brief for National Treasury Employees Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 7, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473)).
81. Id. at 2471.
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The Court next addressed the argument that agency fees were consistent with the
Court’s cases about First Amendment rights in the context of public employment. In
general, those cases establish that public-sector employees have no protection from
employment consequences that stem from their speech if it is “part of what the
employee is paid to do”82 or is about a matter of only private concern.83 In contrast,
employers may punish employees who speak as citizens and about matters of public
concern only if their interest in providing efficient public service outweighs the
employee/citizen’s interest in “commenting upon matters of public concern.”84 This
general framework was established by three key Supreme Court cases—Pickering v.
Board of Education, Connick v. Myers, and Garcetti v. Ceballos.
Responding to that argument, the Court began by subtly shifting its focus from
whether agency fees were consistent with public employees’ free speech rights to
whether Abood was consistent with those rights, stating that “we have previously
taken a dim view of similar attempts to recast problematic First Amendment
decisions.”85 Then, the Court distinguished the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti
framework for three reasons. First, those cases involved the ad hoc punishment of
individual employees, rather than “a blanket requirement that all employees
subsidize speech.”86 This purported difference between an individual employee’s
speech and many employees’ payment of agency fees figured prominently in the
Court’s analysis. I critique this approach in detail in Section I.D, but the key point is
that the Court considered the union speech enabled by all of the employees’ agency
fees and union dues taken together, and then focused on the potential consequences
of that speech. Thus, the Court wrote that it is a matter of only private concern when
“a single employee complains that he or she should have received a 5% raise,”
whereas “a public-sector union’s demand for a 5% raise for many thousands of
employees it represents would be” a matter of public concern because of the potential
budgetary effects of the public employer’s decision to agree to the raise.87 Second,
the Court wrote that the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti line of cases did not involve
compelled speech.88 Third, and finally, the Court concluded that “[s]uperimposing
the Pickering scheme on Abood would significantly change the Abood regime.”89
Finally, after rejecting stare decisis arguments for retaining Abood,90 the Court
turned to the second issue in the case: whether a constitutional problem arises when
a union and public employer adopt an opt-out default, by assuming that represented
workers will pay for union representation unless they opt out. 91 As in Knox, the Court
held that this arrangement was unconstitutional, and an opt-in default was

82. Id. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006)).
83. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–49 (1983)).
84. Id. (quoting Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 653 (2014) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))).
85. Id. at 2472.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2472–73.
88. Id. at 2473.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 2478.
91. See id. at 2486.
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constitutionally required.92 I have previously criticized the inadequacy of the Court’s
analysis in Knox,93 which was perhaps attributable, at least in part, to the fact that the
opt-in/opt-out issue was not briefed by the parties.94 But although the issue was
briefed in Janus, the Court’s analysis was no more detailed: whereas its discussion
of the main issue in the case spanned dozens of pages, this issue consumed only a
single paragraph:
This [opt-out] procedure violates the First Amendment and cannot
continue. Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may
be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be
made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively
consents to pay. By agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First
Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed. Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see also Knox, 567 U.S., at 312–313.
Rather, to be effective, the waiver must be freely given and shown by
“clear and compelling” evidence. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (plurality opinion); see also College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680–
682 (1999). Unless employees clearly and affirmatively consent before
any money is taken from them, this standard cannot be met.95
Of course, there is no reason for any court to pad the application of straightforward
legal principles with repetitive explanation. But the opt-in issue was not
straightforward, nor—with the exception of Knox—were the cases on which the
Court relied so obviously on point that no further explanation was warranted. The
main case on which the Court relied, Johnson v. Zerbst, concerned waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel; the Zerbst Court’s analysis relied on the inability
of “[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman” to defend himself without counsel,
and held that “whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must
depend . . . upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” 96 But the waiver
of the right to counsel is not obviously analogous to waiving the right not to pay
union fees for several reasons, including that if an opt-out default is a First
Amendment problem, then so is an opt-in default.97 And in any event, in adopting a
blanket opt-in default, Janus’s approach differs from the Zerbst Court’s call for a
context-sensitive analysis of the sufficiency of a particular individual’s alleged
waiver of the right to counsel.
The second half of the Court’s paragraph about defaults establishes that not only
must union-represented workers opt into paying union fees, they must do so by “clear

92. See id.
93. See Garden, supra note 42.
94. See generally Brief for Petitioners, Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567
U.S. 298 (2012) (No. 10-1121), 2011 WL 4100440; Brief for Respondent, Knox, 567 U.S. 298
(No. 10-1121), 2011 WL 5908951.
95. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 (parallel citations omitted).
96. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463–64 (1938) (citations omitted).
97. See Garden, supra note 42, at 902.
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and compelling” evidence.98 This evidentiary standard was not discussed in Knox, so
the two cases on which the Court relied in Janus represent the sum total of the Court’s
analysis. The portion of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts on which the Janus Court
relied was a plurality opinion concerning the potential waiver of a First Amendment
argument as a defense to a libel claim.99 The plurality did conclude that waivers of
constitutional arguments must be by “clear and compelling” evidence, but later
Courts have not always applied that standard, even in more directly on-point
situations.100 And College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board was even further afield, rejecting constructive waivers of
state sovereign immunity.101 The key point is that there is no general principle
establishing that First Amendment rights are implicated when government sets a
speech default—much less that the Constitution requires that waivers of
constitutional rights be established by clear and compelling evidence. 102 Thus, the
Court’s reliance on a small number of cases drawn from different contexts obscures
what is really going on: the Court is finding a new constitutional principle that—at
least for now—applies only to protect represented workers who do not join their
unions vis-à-vis those unions.
This subpart has described and analyzed key portions of the majority opinion in
Janus. Parts I.B and I.C discuss in more detail two problems with Janus’s analysis
that are apparent on the face of the decision itself—first, its disregard for the First
Amendment rights of unions and pro-union employees, and second, its shifting
treatment of the precise nature of the claim at issue.
C. Who Counts as a Speaker in Janus?
Perhaps the most fundamental problem with the Janus majority’s reasoning is that
it treats objectors as compelled speakers while ignoring that their First Amendment
rights are inextricably linked to the First Amendment interests of unions and union
members. That is, holding that represented nonmembers cannot be required to pay
agency fees is tantamount to holding that union members must subsidize their
union’s fair representation of nonmembers. Yet these mirror image First Amendment
interests are absent from the Janus majority opinion, which instead treats unions
mainly as economic actors that will react to incentives in predictable (and selfinterested) ways. And workers who want to join their unions aren’t present in the
Janus majority opinion at all, even though Janus effectively held that they must
subsidize their objecting coworkers as a condition both of union representation at
work and of aggregating their voices to participate in politics through their unions.

98. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 (citation omitted).
99. See 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967).
100. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533 (1992) (refusing to consider
petitioner’s due process claim because “[i]n reviewing the judgment of state courts . . . the
Court has, with very rare exceptions, refused to consider petitioners’ claims that were not
raised or addressed below”); cf. U.S. Nat. Bank of Ore. V. Independent Ins. Agents of Am.,
Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993) (holding court of appeals had discretion to consider waived
argument).
101. See 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999).
102. See Garden, supra note 42, at 886–87.
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To state the obvious, unions, union members, and represented nonmembers all
have First Amendment rights, including the rights to speak or refrain from speaking
and to associate or refrain from associating. These rights are implicated in workers’
choices to join their unions just as much as their choices not to join. This is true both
in the doctrinal sense—the Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to
speech and association includes the right to associate with or advocate for a publicsector union103—and in the more conceptual sense that workers can join unions to
convey a literal or metaphoric message. For example, employees may vote for union
representation and then join their unions because they want a more effective voice at
work, because they agree with the union’s political advocacy, or because they want
to affiliate themselves with a larger workers’ movement.104 Conversely, workers who
do not want to do any of these things may vote against union representation and
refrain from joining a union at their workplace. Even before Janus, unionrepresented workers in the public sector were free to refuse union membership; at
most, these workers could be required to pay an agency fee.105 In “right-to-work”
jurisdictions, they could not be required to pay anything.106
Unions also exercise their own First Amendment rights.107 They negotiate on
behalf of represented workers at the bargaining table and in grievance proceedings;
to the extent bargaining involves union proposals that bargaining-unit members
receive particular packages of pay and benefits in exchange for their work, we might
think of them as engaging in commercial speech, 108 although one might also think of
bargaining about pay as being more inherently political than advertising a product at
a particular price. Unions also engage in a list of other activities that are at the core
of the First Amendment’s protection for speech on matters of public concern. A
partial list would include attempts to influence public debates over topics affecting
workers at all levels of government through lobbying and protest, pressure

103. See, e.g., Smith v. Ark. Highway Emps. Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
104. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 182, DO
WORKERS
STILL
WANT
UNIONS?
MORE
THAN
EVER
(2007),
http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp182/bp182.pdf
[https://perma.cc/54CB-DHXC]
(discussing the connection between workers’ desire for union representation and their desire
for voice at work).
105. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222–23 (1976).
106. See
What
Are
‘Right
to
Work’
Laws?,
FINDLAW,
https://employment.findlaw.com/wages-and-benefits/what-are-right-to-work-laws.html
[https://perma.cc/GK8T-VKSB].
107. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down restriction on
independent political expenditures as it applied to corporations and unions).
108. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (framing question about whether commercial speech is protected by the First
Amendment in terms of “whether speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction,’ is so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas’ . . . that it lacks all protection”
(citations omitted)); see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988) (contrasting union speech about the relevance of
working conditions at a job site to the larger community from commercial speech).
Government infringements of union speech that is appropriately treated as commercial speech
would at least receive a form of intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v.
Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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campaigns to encourage public or private actors to treat workers well, and attempts
to convince workers at unorganized workplaces to vote for union representation. All
of these activities are costly, and even before Janus, nearly all of them could be
funded only through union dues (or other union sources of income, such as rental or
investment income) and not through agency fees. 109
After Janus, it will be more difficult for unions to engage in all of these activities,
because as a practical matter public-sector union dues must go towards the
representation of nonpaying nonmembers before they can go toward organizing
drives, printing picket signs, making political donations, or funding any of the other
expenses that undergird organizing and advocacy work. To be sure, this was always
the case in “right-to-work” states, where legislatures had made the policy choice to
bar unions and employers from mandating agency fees. 110 But as Professor Catherine
Fisk and Margaux Poueymirou have described regarding Janus’s predecessor case,
Harris v. Quinn, elevating this policy choice to the constitutional level creates a
mirror-image First Amendment problem111: “On the Court’s analysis, contracts
requiring unionized employees to pay for union representational services compel
speech of dissenters exactly to the same extent that their prohibition compels speech
of unions and their members.”112 Viewed in this light, Abood struck a reasonable
compromise between competing First Amendment interests, whereas Janus overrode
many states’ choices to allow agency fees in order to favor objectors over unions and
their members.113
Janus’s second holding, that nonmembers must opt in before they are charged
union fees, raises a similar problem—one first created in Knox, then extended in
Janus in two ways. First, Janus held that the Knox rule applies to all payments by
represented nonmembers to a labor union rather than to just those imposed in the
middle of the fiscal year; and second, Janus imposed a heightened evidentiary
standard by requiring “clear and compelling” evidence that the employees agreed to
pay “before any money is taken from them.”114 My focus here is a source of speech
inequality that I first described in response to the Court’s decision in Knox: “if an
opt-out violates the First Amendment . . . then an opt-in default should pose a
problem of the same magnitude,” because the choice to pay union fees is just as
expressive as a choice not to pay.115
Assume for a moment that the Janus Court was right that “[b]y agreeing to pay,
nonmembers are waiving their First Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be

109. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 527–31 (1991) (holding that
various categories of union expenses were not chargeable to nonmembers).
110. Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of
Compelled Speech, 48 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 439, 441 (2014).
111. Id. (citing Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014)).
112. Id. at 442.
113. See id. at 439 (“Once the First Amendment rights of unions and union members are
recognized, agency fees emerge as a constitutionally sound accommodation of the interests of
dissenters, unions, and union members.” (emphasis omitted)).
114. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486
(2018) (citation omitted); see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
115. See Garden, supra note 42, at 902.
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presumed.”116 If that is true, then it must be equally true that we cannot assume that
workers who fail to overcome a presumption against paying union fees have
intentionally waived their First Amendment rights.117 Instead, we can be confident
that workers have intentionally waived their rights to pay for their share of their
union’s speech only if they are asked to pay agency fees and refuse. But where
workers do not respond to an opt-in default, we often will not know whether they
preferred not to pay union fees or whether the obligation to opt into union speech had
the effect of deterring speech in which the workers would have preferred to
engage.118
This means that once Janus followed Knox in holding that speech defaults
implicate the First Amendment, it should have followed through by holding that
states could not adopt either a speech or a silence default—an outcome that would
require states that permit workers to pay union fees through check-off to neutrally
inquire about each worker’s payment (or nonpayment) preferences. Instead, the
Court held that the First Amendment requires that states make it more difficult for
workers to “speak” by paying union fees than to “remain silent” by not paying. The
practical effects of this decision will be that unions will have to stretch member dues
to cover representation costs for workers who fail to overcome the silence default
and to fund “internal organizing” efforts intended to encourage workers to take the
affirmative steps necessary to pay the agency fee or join the union and pay dues. 119
To be clear, I think Knox and Janus were wrong in holding that speech defaults
implicate the First Amendment in the first place; in my view, legislatures should be
free to adopt either opt-in or opt-out defaults. One advantage of this approach is that
it comports with what the Court does in nearly every other context, including other

116. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
117. It is true that unions are likely to attempt to approach represented workers to ask them
either to join the union and pay full dues or to pay an agency fee. However, this likelihood is
not a complete answer to the problem of mirror-image First Amendment rights that this
paragraph discusses. First, unions may not reach each represented worker in a timely fashion,
though state laws that allow unions opportunities to conduct an orientation for new hires would
help in this regard. Second, if states adopt onerous opt-in processes, then workers who are
pressed for time still may not manage to overcome these hurdles, even after speaking with a
union representative. Third, even if unions do manage to educate workers about how to opt in
to paying dues or fees, this solution relies on private entities to undo the effects of what, under
the logic of the Knox and Janus decisions, should still be regarded as a First Amendment
violation committed by government employers.
118. Moreover, as I wrote in Meta Rights, people can perceive defaults as conveying a
message about the appropriateness of one choice or another. Thus, it is possible that workers
who otherwise would have chosen to pay an agency fee will be dissuaded from doing so by
the choice of default. See Garden, supra note 42, at 901–04.
119. This is due to the interaction of the duty of fair representation—which requires unions
to fairly represent nonmembers—and the holding in Janus that nonmembers cannot be
required to pay agency fees.
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compelled-speech contexts.120 In fact, as I have explained in detail elsewhere,121 it is
routine for both government and private persons to ask—even sometimes to
pressure—others to waive their First Amendment rights, and those requests are never
thought to raise First Amendment problems of their own. 122 But if we accept Janus’s
internal logic—that speech defaults implicate the First Amendment and that paying
money to a union is equivalent to speaking for First Amendment purposes—then the
implication is that the Janus majority has privileged worker silence over worker or
union speech.
This Part has described one problem with Janus that animates both of that case’s
holdings: that the Court recognizes only one speech interest, when in fact there are
multiple, opposing interests. The next part turns to another problem—that Janus
conflates the plaintiff’s own agency fee with the whole of the union’s
representational speech.
D. The Value of Collective Speech
The Janus majority did not grapple with how its approach to the First Amendment
rights of union objectors harms the ability of unions and union members to engage
in political speech and other advocacy. But it did acknowledge unions’ speech at the
bargaining table, relying on the fact that the public may care about topics resolved
during collective bargaining as a reason to distinguish its prior cases holding that
public employees may face employment consequences for their speech about only
matters of private concern.123 In doing so, the Court lost sight of the nature of the
case before it. At crucial moments, the majority shifted between analyzing the case
as it was—a challenge to Mark Janus’ $535 annual agency fee—and analyzing the
case as though it was a challenge to the whole of the union’s speech.

120. See Garden, supra note 42, at 893–95 (describing government-created “speech
defaults” in other contexts; for example, schools routinely lead all students in saying the
Pledge of Allegiance, even though students have the right not to participate, and departments
of motor vehicles often issue license plates with the state motto printed on them, even though
drivers have a First Amendment right to obscure the motto).
121. Garden, supra note 42, at 887.
122. In other contexts, the Court has held that bureaucratic requirements violate the First
Amendment by making it too difficult for people to engage in speech—for example, a core
part of the Court’s reasoning in Citizens United v. FEC was that the challenged portion of
campaign finance law “is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a [political
action committee] created by a corporation can still speak.” 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010). Here,
the Court’s focus was on the “burdensome” nature of PACs—“they are expensive to
administer and subject to extensive regulations.” Id.
To be clear, I am not arguing that it is as difficult for one worker to provide “clear and
compelling” evidence of their desire to pay their share of union representation costs as it is for
a corporation to form a PAC. Instead, the better analogy is between the PAC requirement and
the burden that Janus imposes on unions to collect qualifying evidence from each represented
worker. This burden may prove to be especially significant if the Court’s requirement that
employees provide the necessary consent “before any money is taken,” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at
2486, allows union opponents to argue that unions must now obtain new, post-Janus consents,
even from workers who have been paying agency fees for years without objection.
123. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2472–73.
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As described above, Mark Janus was the sole plaintiff remaining in Janus by the
time it reached the Supreme Court. In his complaint, he sought declaratory and
injunctive relief as well as a refund of the fees that he paid during the applicable
statute of limitations period.124 Yet this is how the majority analyzed whether the
public-employee speech at issue involved a matter of public concern: 125
Suppose that a single employee complains that he or she should have
received a 5% raise. This individual complaint would likely constitute a
matter of only private concern . . . . But a public-sector union’s demand
for a 5% raise for the many thousands of employees it represents would
be another matter entirely.126
Here, the majority cited Pickering, but the paragraph might also remind readers
of Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,127 on which the dissent relied.128 Guarnieri was
a public employee who alleged that his employer had wrongly imposed certain job
conditions and had failed to pay $338 in overtime, all in order to retaliate against
Guarnieri for filing a previous union grievance.129 Guarnieri’s argument was that the
job conditions illegally retaliated against him for exercising his right to petition.130
The Court rejected Guarnieri’s claim, holding that the same basic rules established
in the speech context in Pickering and Connick131 also applied in the petition context.
The Court wrote that “[t]he government’s interest in managing its internal affairs
requires proper restraints on the invocation of rights by employees when the
workplace or the government employer’s responsibilities may be affected.”132
Significantly, the Guarnieri Court expressed concern that “[e]mployees may file
grievances on a variety of employment matters, including working conditions, pay,
discipline, promotions, leave, vacations, and terminations.”133 If those grievances
were accompanied by robust First Amendment protections, then “[b]udget priorities,
personnel decisions, and substantive policies might all be laid before the jury. This
would raise serious federalism and separation-of-powers concerns,” and “consume
the time and attention of public officials.”134 The potential for courts to second guess

124. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 15–17, Rauner v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., &
Mun. Emps., Council 31, No. 1:15-CV-01235 (N.D. Ill. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Janus v. Am.
Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
https://ljc-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/12/Rauner-v.-AFSCME-120-First-Amended
-Complaint-2015.06.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/F676-V7BG].
125. As discussed above, see supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text, this is important
because the Court’s public-employee speech cases hold that public employees enjoy First
Amendment protections against employment consequences for their speech only if they were
speaking as citizens on a matter of public concern.
126. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2472–73 (citing Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
127. 564 U.S. 379 (2011).
128. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
129. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 384.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 387.
132. Id. at 392–93.
133. Id. at 391.
134. Id.
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public employers’ decisions was a reason to limit public employees’ rights so that an
employee fired for demanding a raise would not have a First Amendment claim.
The distinction between asking for an individual raise and asking for a raise for
everyone was thus key to the Court’s analysis of why the case was different from the
Pickering/Connick line of cases as well as from Guarnieri.135 The Court also relied
on that distinction in Harris v. Quinn.136 But that distinction is inapt—or, more
precisely, its applicability hinged on the Court conflating Mark Janus’s agency fee
with the whole of the union’s speech at the bargaining table.
In other words, the Court treated a lawsuit over Mark Janus’s $535 agency fee as
a lawsuit over “a public-sector union’s demand for a 5% raise for the many thousands
of employees it represents.”137 But it is not clear why that should be the case. To be
sure, there is a sense in which Janus’s agency fee helped facilitate the union’s ability
to make a credible bargaining demand, just like it helped the union keep the lights in
the office on, reimburse employees’ travel, and the like. But Janus was also one of
tens of thousands of represented workers, and presumably, every (or nearly every)
worker was paying either union dues or agency fees.138 This means that, although the
union’s ability to engage in effective collective bargaining would be harmed if many
workers stopped contributing, the union’s bargaining-table speech likely would have
been unaffected if Janus alone stopped paying.
If this is true, then perhaps the right approach would have been to treat Janus’s
agency fee as though it paid for none of the union’s speech. Or perhaps the Court
should have attempted to translate Janus’s fee into some unit of the union’s speech—
say, two hours of a lawyer’s time preparing or prosecuting a single grievance. But
under either of those two approaches, Janus’s agency fee (and the speech it actually
funds) starts to look much more like a matter of private concern—closer to the single
employee asking for a raise than to the union demanding a raise for everyone. And
if this is right, then the Court’s Pickering analysis rested on a flawed foundation—
the Court should have kept its focus on Janus’s agency fee and treated it as equivalent
to speech on a matter of private concern.
There is another potential problem with the Court’s distinction between an
individual employee seeking a raise and a public-sector union seeking a raise for
everyone. The Court implies that the distinction turns on the fact that wages and
working conditions that apply to entire workforces affect the public fisc in ways that
individual raises do not. But it seems unlikely that the Court would deem it a matter
of public concern if an individual employee went to their boss and said, “I think you
should give everyone in the workforce a five percent raise.” This suggests that the
operative difference between the individual employee’s request and the union’s
request is not that one is on behalf of a single employee and the other is on behalf of
many employees. Instead, the key difference is how the public employer is likely to
respond—the public employer is under a statutory obligation to bargain only with

135. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2492–93 (2018).
136. See 573 U.S. 616, 654 (2014).
137. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2473.
138. See AFSCME Council 31 - Organizational History, AFSCME COUNCIL 31,
https://www.afscme31.org/about/afscme-council-31-organizational-history
[https://perma.cc/29QN-Z87N].
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the union, not with the individual who seeks a raise for everyone. In other words, if
one accepts the Court’s premise that the public is likely to be concerned about
increasing payroll budgets, which are not implicated by individual requests for raises,
then it is less a matter of concern what the union asks for in bargaining than how the
public employer responds. Consider the following example: assume a state adopts a
statute barring its agencies from agreeing to any raise whatsoever in collective
bargaining. Nonetheless, a public-sector union asks for a raise. Is that request still a
matter of public concern? Presumably not, because the state would be barred from
agreeing to the raise, and so there is no chance that the bargaining demand would
lead to an increased tax burden or any other results for the public.
All of this suggests that the Court was wrong to treat Janus as a case that raised
the issue of whether the entirety of a union’s speech was a matter of public concern.
But even accepting that framing, the Court was wrong to treat any union speech that
occurs in the context of collective bargaining as speech on a matter of public concern.
At a minimum, the policy environments that shape employer responses to union
demands play a role in whether particular instances of union speech really involve
matters of public concern as the Court understood that term.
This Part has focused on Janus’s internal contradictions; the next Part looks
outward, contrasting the Court’s treatment of political advocacy by unions to its
treatment of other political advocacy.
II. ABOOD, JANUS, AND MONEY IN POLITICS
Abood, Janus, and other agency-fee cases are about the rights of union objectors,
but they are also about unions’ political advocacy and about unions’ and workers’
money in politics. And although they are not typically included in lists of key
campaign finance cases, their implications for unions’ and workers’ spending on
politics are as significant or more significant for unions as cases like Citizens United
v. FEC. The distinction is that, whereas Citizens United and related cases enlarge
unions’ rights to engage in political speech as a legal matter,139 Janus limits what
money is available for public-sector unions’ political speech by requiring unions and
union members to subsidize nonmembers’ representation, thereby restricting what
unions can say as a practical matter.140
When one considers Janus in light of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance
cases, a troubling inconsistency emerges. On one hand, the Roberts Court has
repeatedly held that government cannot adopt policies designed to respond to the
effects of economic inequality in the political process, at least when those policies
might discourage political spending by the rich. On the other hand, the Court took
precisely the opposite view in Janus, effectively imposing a political participation
tax on workers who choose to associate with their unions in order to try to make
themselves heard in politics.
I begin this Part by discussing the relationship between two cases that have been
squarely overruled by the Roberts Court: Abood, and the 1990 campaign-finance case

139. See infra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
140. See infra note 180.
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Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.141 This Part argues that those two
cases had a consistent worldview regarding the relationship between individuals,
organizations, money, and politics. Then, I contrast the reasons that the Roberts
Court overruled Abood and Austin, illustrating the divergence between the way the
Court now treats political spending by the rich and by the working class.
A. Limiting Economic Influence in Political Advocacy: Abood and Austin
As discussed briefly above, the Abood Court relied in part on Buckley v. Valeo’s
holding that campaign contributions are a form of First Amendment activity: quoting
Buckley, the Abood Court wrote that “[m]aking a contribution . . . enables likeminded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals.” 142
From there, the Court reasoned that requiring public-sector employees, on pain of
job loss, to pay to unions money that those unions would eventually use to engage in
partisan politics was unjustified.143 The same basic principles hold in the private
sector, although for statutory rather than constitutional reasons. 144 Before Abood, the
Court decided, in International Association of Machinists v. Street, that the RLA
authorized collective-bargaining agreements that require workers to pay agency fees,
but no more.145 The Court wrote that the statute did not authorize unions and
employers to require employees to pay money to “support candidates for public
office, and advance political programs,” as those uses “fall[] clearly outside the
reasons advanced by the unions and accepted by Congress why authority to make
union-shop agreements was justified.”146 And in a later case interpreting the NLRA,
the Court wrote that Congress intended to solve the union’s free-rider problem by
allowing agency fees, but not mandatory fees for “unrelated” union activities. 147
In summary, the Court’s pre-Janus agency-fee case law held that neither privatesector nor public-sector unions could require workers to pay full dues as a condition
of working for a unionized employer; this was for constitutional reasons in the public
sector and for statutory reasons in the private sector.148 This meant that neither
public- nor private-sector unions could use their economic influence—their position
as an elected exclusive representative of a group of employees—to compel
employees to pay money toward the union’s political advocacy by demanding that

141. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
142. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1976) (alteration and omission in
original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976)).
143. Id. at 235.
144. I have elsewhere critiqued the Court’s statutory analysis in these cases; this paragraph
does not repeat that criticism and provides only a brief description of the Court’s reasoning.
See generally Garden, supra note 24.
145. 367 U.S. 740, 771 (1961).
146. Id. at 768.
147. Commc’ns Workers. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 759 (1988).
148. In most contexts, unions and employers could require employees to pay agency fees.
But, the Court held in Harris v. Quinn that so-called “partial public employees”—employees
who were paid by a governmental entity but whose work is directed and supervised by private
individuals—could not be required to pay any union dues or fees. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
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employers fire employees who refused to pay full union dues.149 This also meant
there was a direct link between the strength of unions’ political advocacy and the
underlying will of the union’s represented employees—represented employees who
objected to a union’s political positions could avoid funding those positions by
becoming agency-fee payers. To be clear, this is not to say that each union member
necessarily agreed with each of their union’s political positions—nor is it to say that
every nonmember disagrees with each position. There are many reasons that a
represented worker might decide to join or to not join their union, and that decision
might be the result of carefully weighing various (potentially competing) factors, or
it might be made relatively passively. But at minimum, a worker who objected to
their union’s political priorities could both opt out of paying money that the union
would eventually use to effectuate those priorities, and could actively support other
priorities.150
That general approach—prohibiting unions from using their economic influence
to strengthen their political clout—was consistent with the Court’s earlier more
general stance regarding the regulation of independent political expenditures by
corporations. One (now-overruled) case—Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce—detailed that approach. 151
In Austin, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Michigan law that
prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds for independent
expenditures, though it allowed corporations to engage in political spending using
separate segregated funds.152 Michigan did not impose the same restrictions on
unions, which were free to use general treasury funds for state-level political
advocacy.
Upholding the law, the Court focused on the relationship—or lack thereof—
between the reasons that people might affiliate with corporations and their support
for the corporation’s political advocacy. As the Court put it, “[s]tate law grants
corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, and
favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets.” 153 Further, these
advantages attract investors and other stakeholders for much the same reason that
individual workers might decide to work for a unionized employer—to make money.
Thus, the Court continued, “[t]hese state-created advantages not only allow
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also permit them
to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace.’”154 The source of the “unfair advantage” was

149. Even before Janus, unions could not say even that much in “right to work” states,
where statutes barred unions and employers from mandating agency fees. See supra text
accompanying note 34.
150. Unionized workers generally earn a wage premium over nonunion workers. See, e.g.,
JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 45 (2014); Sachs, supra note 26, at 1048
n.11 (reviewing literature regarding the union wage premium). This means that a unionrepresented worker who opposed their union’s political agenda would likely have more
disposable income to contribute toward opposing that agenda.
151. See 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
152. Id. at 654.
153. Id. at 658–59.
154. Id. at 659 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238,
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that people or entities would decide to make investments for economic reasons—
reasons that were influenced by the state-conferred advantages of the corporate
form—and then corporations could use the invested funds on their political
priorities.155 This reasoning came to be known as the “anti-distortion” rationale for
restricting corporate political spending, because it focused on “the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support
for the corporation’s political ideas.”156
The Court’s discussion of the anti-distortion rationale focused on the stateconferred benefits of the corporate form in attracting investments, but its reasoning
went further. The plaintiff in the case—the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
(“Chamber”)—was not a traditional for-profit corporation. Rather, it was a
“nonprofit ideological corporation” that had members rather than investors, 157 Still,
the Court wrote that Michigan’s law could be applied to the Chamber for two main
reasons. First, member businesses could join for reasons other than a desire to
contribute to the Chamber’s political spending,158 and second, Michigan could decide
to protect businesses’ ability to participate in the Chamber’s nonpolitical program
without also paying a portion of membership dues that went towards the Chamber’s
political advocacy.159 Further, the Court observed that many of the Chamber’s
members were corporations, which “could circumvent [Michigan’s] restriction by
funneling money through the Chamber’s general treasury.”160 In other words,
Michigan could both follow the money from corporate bank accounts to the Chamber
and impose limits on all of the Chamber’s political advocacy in order to protect the
integrity of the corporate expenditure limit.
Finally, the Court rejected the Chamber’s argument that Michigan’s restriction on
corporate independent expenditures was unconstitutionally underinclusive because
it did not include labor unions. Here, the Court explicitly tied its analysis to its
agency-fee case law, citing Abood and Beck,161 and writing that as a result of those
cases, “the funds available for a union’s political activities more accurately reflects
members’ support for the organization’s political views than does a corporation’s
general treasury.”162
What is important here is the relative consistency of the Court’s approach to
political advocacy by unions and other types of associations in Abood and Austin.
Most significantly, by attending to the different reasons that persons might pay
money to an entity that engages in political advocacy, the Court’s approach limited

257 (1986)).
155. Id. at 660 (“[T]he unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the
amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures.”).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 661.
158. Id. at 662.
159. Id. at 663 (distinguishing the Chamber from nonprofit organizations that existed only
to engage in political advocacy).
160. Id. at 664.
161. Id. at 665 (citing Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U. S. 735, 745 (1988); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977)).
162. Id. at 666.
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(or allowed legislatures to limit) the extent to which an entity’s economic influence
could be leveraged to yield political influence. Further, it permitted legislatures to
calibrate their approaches to regulating corporations and unions in light of the degree
of leverage that each could bring to bear on their respective constituencies.
Of course, there are also important differences between the cases. Chief among
them, Austin allowed legislatures flexibility in regulating corporations, and Abood
took away flexibility in regulating public-sector unions by prohibiting legislatures or
public employers from agreeing to a union security clause that required represented
workers to pay anything more than an agency fee. Nothing about the holding in
Austin required Michigan to protect shareholders by regulating corporate
independent expenditures, nor did Austin require Michigan to exclude unions from
its independent expenditure ban in light of Abood. But, as the next Section will show,
this rough parallelism between the Court’s treatment of union and corporate political
advocacy was much closer than the Court’s more recent approach.
None of this is to say that either Abood or Austin is unassailably correct. For
example, the premise that courts or legislatures should think of either union dues or
shareholder funds as “belonging” to the payer even after they have been transmitted
to the union or the corporation and spent on other things is dubious at best.163 Further,
the Austin Court distinguished Buckley v. Valeo, which struck down limits on
independent expenditures by individuals,164 by implying that spending by
corporations but not by individuals reflects the influence of state-conferred benefits
associated with the corporate form. That distinction means that legislatures could
respond to independent political spending by Koch Industries, but not by Charles and
David Koch. But is it reasonable to say that the latter’s fortunes are unrelated to
economic benefits achieved with help from the legal benefits of corporate status?
And what about individuals whose personal fortunes are attributable to other legal
regimes? Shouldn’t legislatures be able to respond to distortions that they cause in
the political arena as well? Perhaps the Court could have reconciled these
inconsistencies by overruling the relevant portion of Buckley in another case—but,
as discussed in the next Section, the Court instead overruled Austin in a series of
decisions in which the Court’s treatment of unions’ political advocacy increasingly
diverged from its treatment of political advocacy by other entities.

163. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association
Rights after Knox v. Seiu, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1073 (2013) (arguing that
because money is fungible, it does not make sense to treat a particular amount of money in a
union’s bank account as belonging to the person who paid it); Todd E. Pettys, Unions,
Corporations, and the First Amendment: A Response to Professors Fisk and Chemerinsky, 99
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 23, 29–30 (arguing that it does not make sense to attribute corporate
spending to particular shareholders because “the corporation typically obtains the money it
uses to engage in political speech not from shareholders, but rather from revenues the
corporation generates through sales to its customers”); Sachs, supra note 26 (arguing that
agency fees should be regarded as union property because the union negotiates the wage
premium from which agency fees are deducted).
164. 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
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B. Economic Influence in Political Advocacy, and the Increasing First Amendment
Isolation of Unions
The Court’s post-Austin shift in (nonunion) campaign finance cases is exemplified
by three cases: Davis v. FEC,165 Citizens United v. FEC,166 and Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.167 This Section discusses these
three cases in turn, focusing on how they diverge from the Court’s recent treatment
of unions and union members in agency-fee cases.
First, in Davis, the Court struck down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s
(BCRA) “Millionaire’s Amendment.” Roughly, the Millionaire’s Amendment raised
the individual contribution limits applicable to candidates running against opponents
who spent more than $350,000 of their own money on their campaign.168 The
plaintiff, Jack Davis, was a candidate who declared his intention to spend one million
dollars of his personal funds in pursuit of a seat in the House of Representatives
during the 2006 election cycle; the FEC also alleged that Davis had failed to make
required disclosures about his personal spending on his campaign during the previous
cycle.
Davis successfully argued that differential contribution limits violated his First
Amendment rights.169 The majority opinion began by relying on Buckley to discuss
the “fundamental nature of the right to spend personal funds for campaign speech.”170
Yet the Millionaire’s Amendment—unlike the provision the Court struck down in
Buckley—did not cap the amount that candidates could spend on their own
campaigns. Instead, the Davis majority held, the Amendment “imposes an
unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that First
Amendment right.”171 The problem, the Court continued, was that the prospect of
facing an opponent who could raise more money from individual contributors might
deter wealthy candidates from spending the amount that would trigger the
Amendment.172
Having concluded that the First Amendment was triggered by the Millionaire’s
Amendment, the Court went on to consider whether the Amendment could
nonetheless survive strict scrutiny. Holding that it did not, the Court rejected
“level[ing] electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth” as
even a legitimate objective.173 Instead, the Court wrote that being “wealthy” or
“hav[ing] wealthy supporters” were simply items on a list of potential strengths that
different candidates would have to different degrees—and legislatures should not be
permitted to make “judgments about which strengths should be permitted to
contribute to the outcome of an election.”174

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

554 U.S. 724 (2008).
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
564 U.S. 721 (2011).
Davis, 554 U.S. at 729 (describing the Millionaire’s Amendment in more detail).
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id. at 741 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 34, Davis, 554 U.S. 724 (No. 07-320)).
Id. at 742.
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To be clear, there is no First Amendment right to run a political campaign against
a relatively poorly financed opponent. Instead, the Davis Court’s conclusion rested
on the fact that government had intervened to help level the playing field. But it is
important to keep in mind that—as the Austin Court recognized, albeit imperfectly—
the playing field is shaped in part by the various legal advantages and disadvantages
that are conferred on candidates by government. As Justice Stevens put it in his
partial dissent, quoting the legal scholar Cass Sunstein, “[a] well-functioning
democracy distinguishes between market processes of purchase and sale on the one
hand and political processes of voting and reason-giving on the other.”175 Davis
collapsed this distinction, instead holding that legislatures could not disincentivize
the wealthy from spending so much on politics that they drown out the voices of their
popular but undercapitalized competitors.
Next, in Citizens United, the Court overruled Austin directly,176 striking down
BCRA’s prohibition on certain corporate and union independent expenditures. The
Court rejected Austin’s anti-distortion rationale,177 citing Davis for the proposition
that “[t]he rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is
a necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits
the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”178 Elaborating
on that point, the Court turned from the interests of corporate speakers to the interests
of listeners: “[t]he Government has ‘muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most
significant segments of the economy.’” 179 But these “voices and viewpoints” can
“advis[e] voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.” 180 Finally,
the Court criticized the distinction between the economic marketplace and the
marketplace for political speech, writing that the First Amendment protects “speech,
even if it was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree
with the speaker’s ideas.”181
Likewise, the Court rejected the protection of dissenting shareholders from “being
compelled to fund corporate political speech” as a compelling government interest. 182
Here, the Court’s reasoning was very brief, limited to the assertions that if the Court
permitted campaign spending restrictions based on this rationale, then government
could also “ban the political speech even of media corporations,” and further, that
“the procedures of corporate democracy” would suffice to protect dissenters. 183

175. Id. at 756–57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Cass R.
Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1390
(1994)).
176. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
177. Id. at 313.
178. Id. at 350.
179. Id. at 354 (alteration in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 361. The Court also rejected the government’s argument that the corporate and
union independent-expenditure ban was justified by the need to prevent corruption or its
appearance. Id. at 356–58.
182. Id. at 361.
183. Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
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Finally, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club, the Court struck down a third method
of regulating money in politics. This time, the case concerned Arizona’s method of
public election financing. Candidates who opted into public financing were generally
eligible for a set amount. But they would also receive extra matching funds when
their privately financed opponents’ expenditures, plus the expenditures by
independent groups, exceeded the initial public financing amount. 184
The Court found that, as in Davis, the First Amendment rights of both privately
financed candidates and their supporters were burdened by the law. 185 In fact, the
Court held that the First Amendment problem was greater than in Davis, because
Arizona’s scheme resulted in the “direct and automatic release of public money”
rather than allowing candidates more generous contribution limits, which would not
matter if the candidate was not able to attract large contributions. 186 Likewise, the
Court wrote that supporters of privately financed candidates who wanted to make
supportive independent expenditures might refrain, or might change their message,
in order to avoid triggering the matching funds.
Arizona defended its law by pointing to its speech benefits, reasoning that it would
result in more “free and open debate that the First Amendment was intended to
foster.”187 But, relying mostly on its own intuition, the Court wrote that the law would
either decrease speech by privately financed candidates or render their speech less
effective by allowing publicly financed candidates to respond to more of it. 188
Remarkably, the Court wrote that “[a]ll else being equal, an advertisement
supporting the election of a candidate that goes without a response is often more
effective than an advertisement that is directly controverted.”189 In one sense, this
statement is unremarkable and probably accurate. But it casts as a First Amendment
good the probability that a wealthy candidate with wealthy supporters will be able to
broadcast their uncontroverted message, leaving voters to make their choices with
only half the story.
Comparing Davis, Citizens United, and Arizona Free Enterprise Club with Janus
shows how the Court’s treatment of unions has continued to diverge from its
treatment of other speakers. First, the three campaign-finance cases make clear that
governments cannot interfere with private entities’ use of their economic influence
to increase the strength of their political messages, even if the source of that influence
was government-conferred. Citizens United put this most clearly: “speech, even if it

184. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 729 (2011).
185. Id. at 737.
186. Id. In addition, the Court observed that the Arizona system could result in additional
matching funds going to multiple publicly financed candidates in three- (or more) way races,
and that privately financed candidates who opted to spend less than the cap might still be
pushed over the cap by independent expenditures, which were out of the candidates’ hands.
See id. at 737–38.
187. Id. at 740 (quoting Brief of State Respondents at 41, Arizona Free Enterprise Club,
564 U.S. 721 (nos. 10-238, 10-239)).
188. Id. at 740–41, 747. The Court compared Arizona’s law to situations in which entities
were literally required to subsidize others’ speech, writing that in both situations, the
government had impermissibly attempted to “increase the speech of some at the expense of
others.” Id. at 741 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
189. Id. at 747.
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was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the
speaker’s ideas” cannot be regulated in order to protect dissenters or prevent
distortion.190
Applying that principle in the union context undermines the Court’s conclusion
in Janus. The Janus Court held that public employees had a First Amendment right
to work for their unionized employers without paying for union representation,
meaning that unions must devote funds to representing nonpaying nonmembers that
they might have preferred to spend on political speech. But if one applies the lens
from Davis, Citizens United, and Arizona Free Enterprise Fund, the Court should
have held that unions had a First Amendment right to engage in political speech,
even if that speech is funded by leveraging a government-conferred position in the
market to negotiate a union security clause. And rather than a First Amendment
response, the workers would have had recourse to only a market response—to
pressure their employers not to agree to such a contract term, or to find work at a
nonunion employer.
Arguably, the analysis in the previous paragraph is flawed because of the
involvement of a public-sector employer. That is, perhaps the public employer’s role
in requiring its employees to pay union dues or fees means the we should regard
those fees as compelled by the government, rather than by a market actor exercising
its economic influence. But even if this is the right way to think about public-sector
agency fees,191 it is doubtful that it makes a First Amendment difference. As
discussed above, at least where unions are not involved, public-sector employees
have limited First Amendment rights at work, and public employers are often
afforded the same types of leeway to manage their workforces as private employers.
Therefore, even if it is correct to deem the public-sector employer to be the source
of the job requirement to pay agency fees, it would not necessarily follow that those
payments violate the First Amendment.
But even if the market pressure argument is ultimately not persuasive in the public
sector, the same counterarguments are not present in the private sector, where unions
are can at most negotiate for workplaces to be agency shops because of the Court’s
interpretations of the RLA and the NLRA.192 As discussed above, those statutes
prohibit unions from using their economic position to take in money that they would
use for political advocacy.193 But this restriction is in tension with the First
Amendment values expressed in the Roberts Court’s campaign finance decisions.
First, under Citizens United, protecting dissenters from funding unwanted political
speech should be an invalid state interest, especially because union dissenters have
democratic remedies—they can attempt to decertify their unions or to discourage
their employer from agreeing to a union security clause—and they can leave their
jobs. The possibility of democratic remedies means that the normative argument for
permitting unions to negotiate union security clauses, requiring employees to pay full

190. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010).
191. Public-sector union fees are often negotiated, although they are sometimes required
by statute. At least where a union negotiates for a union security clause, it makes sense as a
practical matter to attribute the fees to the union’s exercise of bargaining power, rather than to
the (likely indifferent) employer.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 150–52.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 150–52.
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union dues, is stronger than the argument in favor of permitting employers to require
employees’ participation in the employer’s preferred political program—yet the
latter is permitted in many jurisdictions,194 and the political scientist Alexander
Hertel-Fernandez has documented at length how employers already do this. 195
Second, under Davis and Arizona Free Enterprise Club, a First Amendment harm
results when law intentionally deters speakers from political advocacy in which they
would like to engage, and for which they could probably raise the funds, unless that
advocacy is the result of quid-pro-quo corruption or could be seen as such.196 Yet it
is difficult to see how corruption concerns could be implicated by union political
advocacy supported by union security agreements.
In addition, the campaign finance cases show that there are also listener interests
to consider. Quoting an earlier case, the Citizens United majority emphasized that
corporate political spending was desirable because corporations “best represent the
most significant segments of the economy.”197 Putting aside that the statement
apparently involves a mix of unproven empirical claims and value judgments, there
is a plain analogy to the union context, as unions equally “best represent” a
significant segment of the economy, making their perspectives valuable to the public.
Moreover, the fact that unions can engage in some political advocacy does not undo
the First Amendment violation; the Court emphasized in Arizona Free Enterprise
Club that discouraging additional political advocacy by one class of speakers
implicates the First Amendment as much as banning advocacy by that class of
speakers.
CONCLUSION
It is not yet apparent how the Court’s decision in Janus will affect workers and
unions. But this Article has sought to establish that the Janus decision was
unprincipled both on its own terms and against the backdrop of analogous First
Amendment cases. Further, Janus’s effects will likely extend beyond public sector
workers’ terms and conditions of employment by also limiting workers’ abilities to
make themselves heard in the political process.

194. See Note, Citizens United at Work: How the Landmark Decision Legalized Political
Coercion in the Workplace, 128 HARV. L. REV. 669 (2014).
195. See generally ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, POLITICS AT WORK: HOW COMPANIES
TURN THEIR WORKERS INTO LOBBYISTS (2018).
196. See supra note 187.
197. 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2011) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93,
257–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).

